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This  study  attempts  to  analyse  how  uncertainty  about  future  government  spending 
affects the representative individual’s lifetime utility by using a discrete inter-temporal 
optimizing model. Intuitively, the study shows that the overall effect of a highly positive 
domestic-debt repayment gap is such that the  expected government spending for the 
next period will go down. The implication of the reduction in government spending due to 
uncertainty  about  future  debt  servicing  is  that  the  output  and  the  corresponding 
investment  for  the  next  period  will  be  expected  to  go  down.  This  outcome  is  further 
reinforced by the higher taxes imposed on consumers in an attempt to minimise the next 
period’s domestic-debt repayment gap. 
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In this study, we set out to analyse fiscal uncertainty of donor herding behaviour in a low-
income  country  (LIC),  which  is  heavily  dependent  on  foreign  aid  in  order  to  support  its 
budget. Khamfula, Mlachila and Chirwa (2006) develop a model that shows how a domestic 
debt crisis can occur in a low-income country following donor herding. The model advocates 
that for a highly foreign-aid-dependent LIC, a sudden cut in foreign aid, due to donor herding, 
will potentially lead to a domestic debt crisis if there is no adjustment to expenditures. The 
political and economic developments that emerge in an LIC over the years of donor herding 
would present a very strong case to support this theory. The current study seeks to establish 
that, as a result of donor herding behaviour, there is uncertainty regarding future fiscal policy 
changes in an LIC in terms of both the time of occurrence and the size. Such fiscal policy 
uncertainty is bound to occur in a low-income country as a result of donor herding effect in 
which members of the donor community all behave in the same way. 
        A number of models have examined the effect of current and future changes in monetary 
and fiscal policy under perfect certainty about the policy.
1 To our knowledge, nothing has 
been said by the current literature about donor herding and its effects of fiscal uncertainty. 
Dornbusch  (1984,  1986) has  looked  at  the  implications  of  a  model  for  unexpected  fiscal 
policy and for a gradually ending fiscal shock. In such a model, policy rules are known, and 
even though the rules can encapsulate well-behaved random errors, rational expectations are 
correct on average over an arbitrary sample period. Daniel (1989) provides a seminal study 
that  analyses  the  effects  of  uncertainty  regarding  future  fiscal  policy  reversal.  Daniel’s 
analysis is founded on the empirical fact that there have been periods in which uncertainty 
regarding changes in fiscal policy rules appears to have played a dominant role in determining 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Branson, Fraga and Johnson (1986) and Frankel and Razin (1986).   4 
macroeconomic performance. Bulir and Hamann (2003) have focused on aid volatility; and 
Lesink and Morissey (1999) have analysed the implications of aid uncertainty on economic 
growth.  
        The rest of the paper proceeds  as follows. Section 2 explains the reason why donor 
herding behaviour is justified. Section 3 explains the occurrence domestic debt crisis after 
donor herding. In section 4, fiscal uncertainty that follows donor herding and domestic debt 
crisis is related. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Why Donor Herding Behaviour? 
 
What are the causes of donor herding behaviour? There are obvious benefits for donors to 
follow one another due to information asymmetries and the cost of information gathering. If 
one particular donor has privileged information on, or expertise in, a particular area, such as 
macroeconomic performance, then it is in the interest of all donors to follow the lead of this 
donor on macroeconomic issues. For the individual donor, this reduces the cost of seeking 
information, and it is easier to justify to the electorate the basis for granting or withdrawing of 
aid.  
        On the other hand, herding may ultimately also be deleterious in the long run. To the 
extent that the assisted government does not have a strong political and legislative process to 
force adjustment in the event of withdrawal of donor assistance, the ultimate result can be the 
rapid accumulation of domestic debt, in the hope that donors cannot walk away indefinitely 
(the good Samaritan’s dilemma), and will ultimately bail out the country. This moral hazard is 
costly in the short run to the effect that it may entail costly debt service and high real interest 
rates, thereby reducing real GDP growth. In the long run, it is costly for donors in that they 
ultimately bail out the country, crowding out other more productive expenditures,  
        Donor herding can be triggered by several factors. For countries with IMF-supported 
programs,  the  non-endorsement  of  a  country’s  economic  program,  for  example  when  the 
program  goes  off-track,  can  entail  cutting  off  of  a  portion  of  donor  assistance  that  is   5 
contingent  upon  good  macroeconomic  performance.  In  other  cases,  bad  governance  and 
corruption play important roles. It is increasingly accepted that for any successful strategy to 
advance economic and developmental policies in low-income countries, there should be an 
atmosphere  of  good  governance.  Such  issues  as  democracy,  transparency,  accountability, 
decentralization, policy ownership and financial integrity are key components of the process 
of good governance. In this context, lack of transparency in government financial operations, 
including accountability in the use of donor aid is often seen as a major cause for triggering 
donor withdrawal.  
        Donor herding can occur in both time and space, both in a positive and a negative sense. 
Donors are often motivated to “promote a champion” in order to show to their electorate and 
world opinion that the policies they support are producing positive results. To the extent that 
aid resources are limited, there is a motivation to get “more bangs for the buck” by supporting 
only  a  limited  number  of  LIC  aid  recipients.  This  leads  to  donor  herding  in  space 
(geographically). Donor herding can also occur in time, i.e., during periods of good economic 
performance, aid is increased and vice versa, in part due to donor conditionality which by 
design  punishes  bad  behaviour  or  outcomes,  leading  to  some  pro-cyclicality  (Bulir  and 
Hamann, 2003, 2005). In our paper, we will concentrate on the latter aspect of donor herding.  
 
 
3. Domestic Debt Crisis after Donor Herding 
 
Khamfula, Mlachila and Chirwa (2006) show how a domestic debt crisis occurs in the event 
of n-successive-period simultaneous withdrawals of aid by aid-donors from a borrowing LIC. 
Their model considers a sequence of T periods of non-aid flows to the LIC following donor 
herding. Thus, from period t+1 up to period T, there is no supply of new loans, namely St+1, 
St+2,…, St+T. As a result of ensuing high real interest rates on the domestic financial market, 
the government will start to default on domestic debt as long as accumulated debt in each 
period is above some threshold level. In each period, there are three likely outcomes:   6 
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where  k t+ ψ  is the actual domestic debt accumulated in period t+k (k = 1, 2,…,T) and 
*
k t+ ϖ  is 
the level of accumulated domestic debt that the government is able to repay in every period. It 
is assumed that the actual domestic debt accumulated ( k t+ ψ ) is determined as follows: 
 
                   k t+ ψ  = f(
d
k t ri + , (DSt+k x
d
k t ri + )




k t ri +  is the real interest rate prevailing on the domestic financial market; DSt+k is the 
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if there is no supply of foreign aid in period t+k 
and 0 otherwise; and (DSt+k x
d
k t ri + )
2 is the square of the interaction variable between DSt+k and 
d
k t ri + . In equation (2), the actual domestic debt accumulated in period t+k,  k t+ ψ , is a strictly 
increasing  function  of  the  square  of  the  interaction  variable,  (DSt+k  x
d
k t ri + )
2;  that  is, 
0 ) ( / > ∂ ∂ + + +
d
k t k t k t xri DS ψ , given that  DSt+k = 1. On the other hand, if DSt+k = 0,   k t+ ψ  is a 
decreasing function of 
d
k t ri + ; that is,  0 / ≤ ∂ ∂ + +
d
k t k t ri ψ .   
        It can be seen from equation (1) that as long as  k t+ ψ  is equal to or less than
*
k t+ ϖ , a debt 
crisis does not occur in the LIC. A debt crisis occurs once  k t+ ψ  is greater than
*
k t+ ϖ . The first 
two  outcomes  will  yield  if  the  government  of  the  LIC  responds  to  donor  herding  by 
simultaneously reducing its expenditures and borrowing a well-calculated sum of loans from 
the  home  financial  market.  If  no  reduction  to  fiscal  expenditures  is  made,  then  the  third 
outcome (domestic debt crisis) is likely to be faced by the LIC. 
 
 
4. Donor Herding, Domestic Debt Crisis and Fiscal Uncertainty 
 
The case of sustained availability of donor aid provides perfect foresight and certainty about 
future consumption and investment decisions in the LIC. The case of donor herding provides   7 
important  welfare  implications  since  in  this  situation  there  is  no  planned  course  of 
government spending on social and economic programmes. The position of foreign investors 
too is not well defined. Thus, individuals plainly do not foresee perfectly the random paths of 
government spending and private investment that can affect their future wage income or the 
payoffs on investments. In the event of donor herding, decisions in the current period can only 
be made on informed guesses about what is likely to happen later on. Our intention here is to 
analyse  how  uncertainty  about  future  government  spending,  in  particular,  affects  the 
representative  individual’s  lifetime  utility  by  using  a  discrete  inter-temporal  optimizing 
model.  
        As pointed out above, Daniel’s (1989) study analyses the effects of uncertainty regarding 
future  fiscal  policy  reversal  by  using  a  model  in  the  tradition  of  Dornbusch  (1976).  The 
weakness of the model used by Daniel, however, is that it is not derived from a consistent 
optimizing framework. We assume that the representative individual, faced with uncertainty, 
maximizes the following expected value of lifetime utility: 
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The operator Et{.} is a mathematical conditional expectation – a probability-weighted average 
of possible outcomes, in which probabilities are conditioned on all information available to 
the decision-maker up to and including date t. Cs is the period consumption level and β the 
subjective discount factor. As explained above, it is assumed that the effects of simultaneous 
aid withdraw start to ensue from period t+1. A riskless bond is the only internationally traded 
asset in this model. We assume for simplicity that the world real interest rate is constant at r
w, 
so that the following current account identity holds: 
 
             CAt+1 = Bt+2 - Bt+1 = Yt+1 + Ht+1 +  r
wBt+1 – Ct+1 – Et(Gt+1) – It+1                   (4) 
 
where Bt+1 is the value of the economy’s net foreign assets at the end of period t, Bt+2 the 
value of the economy’s net foreign assets at the end of period t+1, Ht+1 the level of debt in the   8 
economy in period t+1, Ct+1 the consumption level in period t+1, Yt+1 the output in period 
t+1, It+1 the value of new investment during period t+1 and Et(Gt+1) the expected level of 
government spending for period t+1 given the information set prevailing in period t. The 
value of Et(Gt+1) is effectively estimated by the level of government spending for the current 
period, t; i.e., Gt. The simultaneous retreat by the aid donors will leave the private individual 
with a guess of what value of government spending the next period requires. The immediate 
guess or estimate available is the past period’s value of government spending.  
        The expectation operator on Gt+1 is inevitable since it is assumed that in period t+1 
government spending is a function of the domestic-debt repayment gap, 
*
1 1 + + − t t ϖ ψ , given in 
(1). From equation (2), we know that Gt+1 is also a function of 
d
t ri 1 +  and (DSt+kx
d
t ri 1 + )
2. Thus 
we have Et(Gt+1) = f[Et(
*
1 1 + + − t t ϖ ψ )]. Rearranging terms in the current account identity, we 
have: 
              (1+ r
w)Bt+1 = Ct+1 + Et(Gt+1) + It+1 - Yt+1 - Ht+1 + Bt+2                                    (5)                                     
 
By  iterative  process,  the  stochastic-setting  inter-temporal  budget  constraint  is  given  as 
follows: 
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Equation  (6)  involves  random  variables,  and  its  derivation  must  rule  out  Ponzi  game 
outcomes in which debt grows at the rate of interest rate, regardless of what shocks hit the 
economy of the low-income country. With this restriction in place, the random inter-temporal 
budget constraint must be obeyed with probability one. 
        Using the current account identity (5), we can eliminate consumption levels from Ut+1. 
This transforms the consumer’s problem into the unconstrained maximization of  
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   9 
with  respect  to  consumption  in  period  t+1.  The  first  order  condition  with  respect  to 
unconditional change in Ct+1 obtains the following stochastic Euler equation:  
 
                  u′(Ct+1) = (1+ r
w)βEt+1{u′(Ct+2)}                                                                   (8) 
 
Now,  from  the  explanation  of  Et(Gt+1)  above  we  know  that  the  change  in  utility  of 
consumption in period t+1, u′(Ct+1), is partly driven by the proportion of the expected change 
in the expected level of government spending in period t+2, which is actually the proportion 
of the expected change in Gt+1.
2 Recall that Et(Gt+1) itself is a function of the domestic-debt 
repayment gap, 
*
t t ϖ ψ − . Thus, u′(Ct+1) in equation (8) does not only depend on the world real 
interest rate, r
w, but also indirectly on the domestic real interest rate, 
d ri , through changes in 
government spending, G. This outcome is different from the stochastic Euler equation that 
would obtain in the absence of donor herding in which u′(Ct+1) would partly depend on the 
world real interest rate, r
w, and the expected change in Gt+2 (and not on the expected change 
in Gt+1). Thus, the case of donor herding gives rise to a situation whereby private individuals 
have to adjust their current period’s consumption levels based partly on the expected change 
in the current level of government spending.  
        Intuitively, if the domestic-debt repayment gap for period t+1 is expected to be highly 
positive,  the  next  period’s  expected  government  spending,  Et(Gt+1),  will  be  revised 
downwards.  The  expected  highly  positive  repayment  gap  reflects  fiscal  uncertainty  about 
servicing debts in the next period. The prevailing domestic debt crisis will make it impossible 
for government to source loans from either the domestic financial market or the international 
financial market. This will lead the representative consumer to anticipate a rise in taxes. Part 
of  the  current  level  of  government  revenues  used  for  spending  will  also  be  apportioned 
towards this increase in the repayment gap. The overall effect will be such that the expected 
government spending for the next period will go down. Therefore, due to the downward 
                                                 
2 This can be readily verified from the expression of Ct+2  =  (1+ r
w)Bt+2 – Bt+3 + Dt+2 + Yt+2 – Et+1(Gt+2) – It+2.   10 
revision of the expected government spending for period t+1, the output for period t+1 (Yt+1) 
and the corresponding investment It+1 will be expected to go down. At the same time, this 
outcome is expected to be reinforced by the higher taxes imposed on consumers in an attempt 
to minimise the next period’s domestic-debt repayment gap. Thus, the higher taxes set by 
government will choke private consumption and, hence, discourage savings and investment. 
        The outcomes envisaged in the preceding scenario contrast with the cases where there 
are zero and negative domestic-debt repayment gap that would be expected in period t+1. 
With  a  zero  or  negative  expected  domestic-debt  repayment  gap,  savings,  investment  and 
output are expected to be maintained at least at the current rates. Thus, in the absence of 
uncertainty  about  servicing  debts  in  the  next  period,  savings,  investment  and  output  are 
expected to continue on their current paths.   
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This  study  has  attempted  to  analyse  how  uncertainty  about  future  government  spending 
affects  the  representative  individual’s  lifetime  utility  by  using  a  discrete  inter-temporal 
optimizing model.  It has shown that the change in utility of consumption in the next period is 
partly driven by the proportion of the expected change in the expected level of government 
spending in next of next period which is actually the proportion of the expected change in the 
level  of  next  period’s  government  spending.  Furthermore,  the  change  in  utility  of 
consumption in the next period does not only depend on the world real interest rate but also 
indirectly on the domestic real interest rate through changes in government spending.  
        The  intuition  behind  this  study  is  that  in  the  presence  of  fiscal  uncertainty  the 
representative consumer will anticipate a rise in taxes. The overall effect of a highly positive 
domestic-debt repayment gap is such that the expected government spending for the next 
period will go down. The implication of this reduction in government spending is that the 
output for the next period and the corresponding investment will be expected to go down.   11 
This outcome is further reinforced by the higher taxes imposed on consumers in an attempt to 
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